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Resumen
Este trabajo presenta un modelo de equilibrio general para economías pequeñas y abiertas que se
puede utilizar para evaluar los efectos de distintas alternativas de política. El modelo se estima para
reproducir características esenciales de la economía chilena usando los gradientes de un modelo VAR
identificado como condiciones de calce para el modelo teórico. Este último es lo suficientemente
general como para que se pueda emplear en el análisis de temas como regímenes cambiarios,
controles de capital, metas de inflación y otras políticas aplicadas por la autoridad monetaria. Un
rasgo característico de este modelo es que modela las actitudes de los inversionistas extranjeros en
forma explícita.
Abstract
This paper presents a general equilibrium model for a small open economy that can be used to assess
the effects of alternative policies. The model is estimated in order to replicate key characteristics of the
Chilean economy by using the gradients of an Identified VAR model as matching conditions for the
theoretical model. The theoretical model is sufficiently general so that it can be used to analyze issues
such as alternative exchange rate regimes, controls to capital inflows, inflation targeting, and other
policies used by the monetary authority. A distinguishing feature of this model is that it explicitly
models the attitudes of foreign investors.
_________________
E-mail: rchumace@bcentral.cl.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
As noted by Leeper (1995) “the business pages of leading newspapers give the impression that the
eﬀects of alternative monetary policies on the macroeconomy are well understood and predictable.”
They tend “to write with great certainty that when the monetary authority raises interest rates it
slows economic growth, and with it inﬂation, bidding down stocks and bonds. With equal certainty,
press accounts report that the monetary policy responds to economic conditions.” Statements like
“the recent strength of the economy will prompt the monetary authority to raise interest rates as
a preemptive strike against inﬂation” are not uncommon. With the economy responding to policy
and policy responding to the economy, it is hard to tell what causes what. Chile is no exception,
statements like the previous are frequently found in local newspapers.
However, there is no consensus regarding the interaction of economic conditions and policy. In
fact, while there are several academic papers that directly or indirectly try to identify the eﬀects
of alternative policies, most of the results found are, to say the least, inconclusive.1
Even though the understanding and measurement of the quantitative eﬀects of monetary policy
are essential to evaluate the relative merits of alternative policy arrangements, few papers have
addressed the issue in an integrated and consistent way.2 This paper tries to do so by combining
sound statistical representations with theoretical models. In contrast, most of the empirical liter-
ature focuses on providing statistical descriptions of the data with no correspondence between the
statistical model used to develop the stylized facts intended to explain, and a theoretical model
that is consistent with them.
From the statistical standpoint, the eﬀects that diﬀerent policy arrangements may have over
the economy are usually quantiﬁed using VARs. While this technique may prove to be valuable
for forecasting purposes, it is diﬃcult to obtain a correspondence between the impulse-response
functions that are derived from it and economic principles that may come from contesting theories
(Hamilton, 1994).
As discussed below, the identifying restrictions imposed on VAR impulse-response functions
may not have any meaningful interpretation as they may come from linear combinations of diﬀerent
shocks, thus not providing reliable estimates of the eﬀects of alternative policies. From a theoretical
standpoint there are scarce papers that use models derived from ﬁrst principles to deal in an
integrated fashion with their empirical implications, thus being subject to the Lucas critique from
the get go.
This paper intends to overcome these shortcomings by integrating statistical models that are
able to replicate the intertemporal dynamics of key economic variables with dynamic, stochastic,
optimizing models. Thus, in the presence of a rival theoretical model, the statistical description of
the data provides an objective metric with which to evaluate their merits.
1Rosende and Herrera (1991), Rojas (1993), Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996), Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (1997),
Valdés (1998), Parrado (2001), and some speciﬁcations of Cabrera and Lagos (2002) ﬁnd that output and inﬂation
are aﬀected by innovations in monetary policy. Mendoza and Fernández (1994), Morandé, et al (1995), Calvo and
Mendoza (1999), and some speciﬁcations of Cabrera and Lagos (2002) ﬁnd complete ineﬀectiveness of the monetary
policy to alter their trajectories.
2Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) develop a deterministic general equilibrium model in which liquidity con-
straints and wage rigidities are imposed. This model is calibrated and presents exercises regarding the eﬀects of
alternative policies.
1The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy describes the main problems that traditional
statistical models have when they are used to quantify the eﬀects of alternative policies. Section
3 presents a statistical model that is used as the metric with which to compare the empirical
implications of alternative theoretical models. Section 4 describes an estimates a simple optimizing
model used to replicate the stylized facts reported on section 3. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2I d e n t i ﬁed VARs
VAR models have long been used to describe the dynamic interactions of key macroeconomic vari-
ables in an economy. Even though these models have proven successful as forecasting tools, they
rarely can be used to test competing theories or to interpret their results with sound economic prin-
ciples. It is sometimes argued that the main reason for this to happen is that VARs are restricted
versions of more “structural” models as VARs usually ignore contemporaneous comovements and no
stance regarding the economic principles behind the dynamic interactions encountered is explicitly
tested. Furthermore, VAR models impose arbitrary decompositions to the variance-covariance ma-
trix of the innovations (usually a Cholesky decomposition) making the impulse-response functions
sensitive to the ordering of the model. Several methodologies have been developed to overcome
this shortcoming. However, these functions do not have any direct interpretation in terms of the
dynamic consequences of shocks to any of the underlying innovations.3
Recently developed models intend to overcome the shortcomings of traditional VARs. They are
known as SVARs (for Structural VARs) or IVARs (for Identiﬁed VARs). The main characteristic of
these models is that they nest traditional VARs and do not impose orthogonality restrictions among
the contemporaneous interactions of the variables in the system. They also provide tools that can
be used to conduct inference about restrictions of competing statistical models and, in principle,
provide estimates of the impulse-response functions that are supposed to recover the underlying
structure of the system.4 Nevertheless, as noted by Cochrane (1998) and more forcefully by Cooley
and Dwyer (1998) the robustness of the conclusions drawn from IVAR exercises is questionable.5
2.1 The Usual Practice
As discussed above, several attempts to characterize the dynamic consequences of alternative poli-
cies in the Chilean economy have been made. Nonetheless, most of them were obtained by using
traditional VARs and are subject to the critiques outlined.6 It is instructive however to discuss
3Pesaran and Shin (1998) develop what they call “generalized” impulse-response functions that provide impulse-
response functions that are invariant to the ordering of the unconstrained VAR.
4Appendix A provides a brief description of the IVAR methodology.
5The term Structural VAR is misleading in the sense that it may give the impression that these statistical objects
can be understood as representations of behavioral relations grounded on ﬁrst principles but, as discussed below, this
is usually not the case. On this paper we prefer to use the term IVAR that makes explicit that these models provide
tests that can help to decompose impulse-response functions in a more formal way, but no structural (behavioral)
implications are drawn from them.
6Valdés (1998) estimated what he termed a Semi Structural VAR model. However, the identifying assumption
imposed there, makes it no diﬀerent from a speciﬁc ordering of an unrestricted VAR model and it is not what
we understand as an IVAR. The “restrictions” imposed there correspond to a Cholesky factorization in which the
2some of the methodological issues involved in their estimations.
With rare exceptions (e.g. Calvo and Mendoza, 1999 and Valdés, 1998) most of them do not
report conﬁdence intervals for the impulse-response functions. Furthermore, the studies that do
report them, rely on asymptotic approximations of the conﬁdence intervals of the model but no
formal tests for multivariate normality and vector-white noise innovations are performed, nor the
impulse-response functions are bias corrected.7
When departures from normality are important, conﬁdence intervals based on asymptotic ap-
proximations can be deceiving, given that normality imposes symmetry on them. Furthermore,
asymmetries may also be present when non-linear structures are important; in which case, positive
and negative shocks may imply completely diﬀerent trajectories. In such cases, conﬁdence inter-
vals for the impulse-response functions may still be constructed relying on bootstrap (Sims and
Zha, 1995). However, this practice is itself subject to two problems: First, as discussed below,
most of the variables included on the unrestricted VAR are usually statistically nonsigniﬁcant, but
the bootstrapped model takes their point estimates as given, thus unnecessarily inﬂating the con-
ﬁdence intervals. Second, and more importantly, the conﬁdence intervals usually considered are
constructed using Efron’s suggestion; but as is well documented, these intervals do not have the
correct coverage if the distribution under consideration is asymmetric. Given that bootstrap is used
precisely for these purposes, Hall’s conﬁdence intervals are better suited to deal with departures
from normality.
Another important consideration that has to b et a k e ni n t oa c c o u n ti st h ew a yi nw h i c hs o m eo f
the previous studies dealt with non-stationarities. As Sims et al (1990) demonstrated, VAR esti-
mates with some integrated series are super consistent, however they have non-standard asymptotic
distributions, thus impulse-response functions from these types of series can be constructed from
Monte Carlo or bootstrap approximations (methods that are now readily available and can be rou-
tinely performed). However, in case the source of non-stationarity comes from deterministic trends,
incorrectly diﬀerentiating the series may impose non-trivial dynamics on the model. In particular
unit root type of vector-MA processes would now be incorporated to the series thus making OLS
estimation not advisable.8 Thus, care should be given to when and when not to diﬀerentiate a
variable used to measure the monetary policy stance comes ﬁrst, thus making it exactly identiﬁed. Obviously, there
are no formal tests against alternative orderings or identifying assumptions that can possibly be made in this context.
In fact, the impulse-response of that model can be directly computed without estimating the parameters with the
methodology described on Appendix A. Other examples of such a practice can be found in García (2001) and Cabrera
and Lagos (2002). Parrado (2001) uses the IVAR methodology but, as discussed below, his results are subject to
other problems.
7When estimating VARs or IVARs, it is often forgotten that they need to be correctly speciﬁed prior to conducting
impulse-response exercises. As a minimum, vector-white noise innovations are needed. That is, innovations that are
not only orthogonal to their own past but also orthogonal to the past of the other innovations of the system.
Furthermore, given that the construction of conﬁdence intervals for the impulse-response functions generally rely
on asymptotic approximations, formal tests for multivariate normality of the residuals should be conducted. In the
former case Ljung and Box type of tests can not be applied as they rely on univariate speciﬁcations and Wilks,
Portmanteu or LRT tests should be employed (see Lütkepohl, 1991 for details). This fact is independent of the
information criteria chosen to select a model, given that it is used only to account for parsimony. In the later case,
Jarque-Bera univariate tests for normality are not appropriate and multivariate speciﬁcation should be used (Doornik
and Hansen, 1994).
8In this case, exact (unconditional) maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters should be conducted; this
3variable prior to estimating the VAR.
2.2 Unit Roots and Impulse-Response Functions
With the exception of Parrado (2001), all of the studies discussed on the ﬁrst section chose to
diﬀerentiate the variable that captures the level of activity of the economy (usually the Monthly
Activity Index, hereafter IMACEC). Typical examples of the unbelievable dynamics that result
from impulse-response functions that use ﬁrst diﬀerences on the scale variable can be found in
Valdés (1998) and García (2001). Even if we assume that their models were correctly speciﬁed
in terms of lag selection, normality, and that there were no biases associated with the parameter
estimated; they ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of what they refer to as the “monetary policy
innovation” to the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the scale variable. If the monetary policy innovation has a
negative though transitory eﬀect on the growth rate of the scale variable, what are the implications
f o rt h el e v e lo ft h es e r i e s ? .
s(1) s(2)
Response of Level Response of Difference
Figure 1: Implications of diﬀerent impulse-response functions
Figure 1 shows the implications for both levels and growth rates of a unit shock on the innova-
tions estimated in that case.9 For the sake of comparison, we consider two types of shocks: The ﬁrst
(termed s(1)) corresponds to the eﬀect (in both levels and diﬀerences) of a transitory shock when
the scale variable is modeled in levels thus making the shocks transitory and the level to revert to
its deterministic trend. The second (s(2)) corresponds to the same exercise when the scale variable
is modeled in diﬀerences. As can be seen, the s(2) shocks on monetary policy have increasing and
practice is rarely (if ever) taken, given that it is computationally demanding. Chumacero (2001b) describes a com-
putationally eﬃcient way to deal with this problem.
9The parameters are not chosen to match exactly the impulse-response of the studies in which signiﬁcant eﬀects
are found, but are arbitrarily chosen to demonstrate the eﬀects for the level of the series. The essence of the results
would not change if the actual impulse-response functions reported were used.
4permanent eﬀects on the level of the series even when the shock is not very persistent in terms of
growth rates.
Which type of shock is correct? Chumacero and Quiroz (1996) and Chumacero (2000) show
that there is no evidence to support the practice of diﬀerentiating series such as IMACEC.10 Even
in that case, it is important to consider what are the implications of the shocks for the levels of
scale variables, once we swallow a unit root. As Figure 1 makes clear, such a mighty power of the
monetary policy is diﬃcult to rationalize even in the most extreme of Keynesian models.
2.3 Ordering, Causality, and Interpretation
An even more important problem with these results comes from the interpretation that can be
given to them. As mentioned previously, Valdés (1998) and Cabrera and Lagos (2002) used a
speciﬁc ordering in the construction of the impulse-response functions of their VARs, in which
the “monetary policy” innovation is not “caused” by any other innovation. Even though it is a
common practice to order VARs according to Granger causality results of the variables in levels, the
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix has little to do with that ordering. As a matter of
fact, there is no theoretical basis for justifying a speciﬁc ordering on the impulse-response functions
that come from a Cholesky decomposition based on Granger causality as they may have no relation
with the order of precedence of the levels. More fundamentally, it is not diﬃcult to think of a
theoretical economy in which there is no eﬀect whatsoever of any monetary variable on the real
sector but that presents the dynamics that are claimed to justify the results of Valdés (1998) or
Cabrera and Lagos (2002).
Consider for example, the case of a closed endowment economy with a representative agent that






yt +( 1+rt−1)bt−1 ≥ ct + bt
where y is the level of the endowment, c is the level of consumption, bt is the demand of a risk-free
private bond that pays oﬀ a net return of rt the following period (this return is known at t), u(·)
is strictly increasing and strictly concave, β is the subjective discount factor, and Et denotes the
expectation operator conditional on the information available at time t.








which simply states that the gross return of the asset is a function of the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution (stochastic discount factor).
10Furthermore, Chumacero (2001a) shows both at the theoretical and empirical levels, that it is unlikely for a unit
root to be present in scale variables such as IMACEC.
5Consider now a special case of (1) in which we impose a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) utility function with the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coeﬃcient denoted by γ (inverse








To determine the return of the asset, we need to solve (2), thus needing to explicitly introduce
a law of motion for the endowment process. Consider two of such cases. The ﬁrst assumes that
the (log of the) endowment is diﬀerence-stationary (DS) and the second that it is trend-stationary
(TS):
Case 1 (DS) : ∆lnyt+1 = α +
k X
i=0





Case 2 (TS) : lnyt+1 = η + αt +
l X
i=0





where ε and v are innovations and k and l denote the number of lags necessary to produce them.
Under these assumptions, the return of the asset can be computed as:











δi∆lnyt−i − γvt (TS)
where ai = αγ − lnβ − 0.5γ2σ2
i for i = ε,v.
The purpose of this example is to show that Granger causality and VAR results may be com-
pletely misleading when we attempt to identify impulse-response functions as eﬀects of alternative
policies, thus we focus on rather simple dynamics that help us build the case. For that purpose,



























As rt is known at period t, VAR estimates and Granger causality tests would typically be made
in a system that comprises ∆lnyt and ln(1 + rt). How would Granger causality results from a
system like this look like? Not surprisingly, given that rt is an exact function of the growth rate of
the endowment in period t we will ﬁnd that there should be a strong contemporaneous correlation
between variables whose sign will depend exclusively on the value of δ (in fact, as the relationship
among these variables is deterministic, the contemporaneous correlation should be -1 or 1). As VAR
models and Granger causality tests typically rely on regressions of lagged values of the variables,
Granger causality tests will display bidirectional Granger causality between the asset return and
the growth rate.
6If y is TS, ∆lny has a unit root in its MA component. If we consider a pure trend stationary



























As both variables are functions of innovations, it is not diﬃcult to show that in this case we would
ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of unidirectional causality from the asset returns to the growth rate!
As the endowment presents a combination of two independent innovations, the contemporaneous
correlation between growth and the asset return should be negative (on average) but possibly not
signiﬁcant and rather small.
This exercise intends to show that not all that glitters is gold. In both cases we ﬁnd statistical
evidence in favor of Granger causality from the asset return to the growth rate of the endowment,
even though, in this simple set up there is no real (economic) causation whatsoever in that direction.
As a matter of fact, if there is a variable that causes (in the real sense) the other, is the endowment.
Thus an econometrician that mechanically chooses to interpret Granger causality tests and VAR
results may be completely misinterpreting the actual structure of the economy.
It would not be diﬃcult to replicate impulse-response functions such as the ones described in
Figure 1 from economies such as (3) or (4) if we take the leap of faith that the policy instrument
that the monetary authority uses is the real rate of interest (comparable to our r). As demonstrated
below, this can not be the case. Even if it were, and the instrument of the authority accurately
reﬂected the real return of a risk free bond, impulse-response and Granger causality results can not
be interpreted as useful tools for identifying the eﬀects of alternative policies. Economics and not
pure statistics must be used to do so.
A st h ee x a m p l e sm a k ec l e a r ,V A R so rI V A R sc a n n o tb eu s e dt ot a c k l et h et a s ko fi d e n t i f y i n g
the eﬀects of alternative policies. However, there is a reason why well-speciﬁed time series models
could be used, and it is simply to provide a (statistically) objective metric under which alternative
theoretical models (that are, at least in principle, robust to the Lucas critique) could be compared.
Next, we discuss this issue.
3T h e M e t r i c
This section presents the results of a nine variable IVAR model for the Chilean economy. This
model is intended to provide a good statistical description of the variables included, but we are
careful of not providing any “structural” interpretation to it. Special attention is taken to test the
proper order of the model and to test whether or not the innovations are jointly Gaussian.
The variables taken into consideration correspond to monthly time series from 1985:01 to 2001:07
of the (log of the) industrial production index of the US (y∗), the (log of the) ﬁrst diﬀerent of the US
WPI (p∗), the (log of) real money holdings in the US (m∗), the (log of the) FEDs fund rate (i∗), the
(log of the) real exchange rate (e), the (log of the) monthly activity index of Chile (IMACEC and
denoted by y), the (log of the) ﬁrst diﬀerence of the Chilean CPI index (p), the (log of) domestic
real money holdings (denoted by m), and the (log of the) Chilean monetary policy rate (set by the
Central Bank and denominated in UF, d). In all cases a quadratic trend was included to take into
account possible smooth changes in trends over time.
73.1 Parsimony
The ﬁrst step in estimating the IVAR is to compute the unrestricted VAR. This computation is
done following the usual OLS regressions for each variable on the system and choosing the optimal
lags. Privilege must be given to a representation that is able to obtain innovations prior to reducing
it to a parsimonious representation.
As is well known, model selection based on the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) tends to
choose models that are less parsimonious than the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), Hannan-
Quinn Criteria (HQC), or Final Prediction Error Criteria (FPE). In our case, AIC prefers a model
with 13 lags while BIC and HQC choose only 1 lag. Finally, FPE prefers a VAR(2) model. Ex-
tensive LRT tests on the residuals show that even a VAR(1) is able to produce residuals that
can be characterized as vector-white noise processes but that present important departures from
Gaussianity.
Order Number of Parameters Saturation Ratio % of Nonsigniﬁcant Variables
1 108 0.061 0.509
2 189 0.107 0.614
3 270 0.154 0.704
4 351 0.201 0.729
5 432 0.249 0.771
6 513 0.300 0.791
7 594 0.346 0.806
8 675 0.395 0.824
9 756 0.444 0.783
10 837 0.495 0.808
11 918 0.545 0.849
12 999 0.597 0.822
Table 1: Implications of the choice of diﬀerent lags
Table 1 shows the eﬀect of a phenomena that is often over-looked in practice. As all models
consider the dynamic interactions of nine variables, increasing the number of lags has non trivial
eﬀects on the parsimony and accuracy of the estimation. In particular, even simple unconstrained
VAR(1) models include more than 50% of its parameters that are not statistically signiﬁcant at
standard levels. Thus, any unconstrained version of the model may induce to spurious dynamics
that are not present in the data if we ignore this fact. Furthermore, even small order VAR models
(such as for example a VAR(4)), have a huge saturation ratio (ratio between the number of pa-
rameters estimated in each equation and the sample size). In that particular example, more than
20% of the sample is compromised in estimating the parameters of each equation.
The eﬀects of not accounting for parsimony, not only aﬀect inference when obtaining boot-
strapped conﬁdence intervals, but also may substantially modify the impulse-response functions
themselves. Figure 2 shows that this is indeed the case. Even when using the traditional Cholesky
decomposition for the computation of the impulse-response functions, obtaining them from the un-
constrained VAR(2) model that ignores that more than 61% of the variables are redundant enhances

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Eﬀects of not considering parsimony in Cholesky impulse-response functions. Continuous
line: parsimonious VAR. Dashed line: unconstrained VAR.
3.2 Choice of the Impulse-Response Function
Once the VAR model is estimated, tests of identiﬁcation can be performed in order to assess the
characteristics of the B0 matrix that best ﬁts the data if IVAR models are to be considered. Recall
that diﬀerent speciﬁcations of this matrix will modify non-trivially the impulse-response functions,
thus special attention should be given to this point. Likelihood ratio tests, AIC, and BIC in the
11As discussed above, the FPE criteria chooses the VAR(2) model, while BIC and HQ prefer the VAR(1) model.
Nevertheless, the parsimonious VAR model in the case of the VAR(1) model fails to produce vector-white noise errors.
Thus, we conduct all the following exercises using a VAR(2) as the baseline model.
9line of Leeper (1995) and Leeper, et.al. (1996) were used while testing this speciﬁcations.12
The preferred speciﬁcation for B0 has a similar structure to the Cholesky decomposition, but
contrary to the identifying assumption of Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (1997) and Valdés (1998),
monetary instruments should be ordered precisely in the opposite direction, tending to react con-
temporaneously to innovations in the price equation and output equation. One important feature
of using IVAR models is that inference regarding the contemporaneous associations of the innova-
tions can be performed once the parameters of B0 are estimated by maximum likelihood. If this
is done, most of the variables considered in B0 can not be considered as statistically signiﬁcant.
Furthermore, Parrado (2001) imposed a diﬀerent structure on his IVAR model, but most of the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Generalized impulse-response functions. Hall’s bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals in
parenthesis.
12See Appendix A for details.
10Thus, IVAR models also impose arbitrary decompositions on the impulse-response functions
that results from it if statistically insigniﬁcant parameters are considered. Thus, we chose the report
the impulse-response functions that are obtained using Pesaran and Sin’s (1998) methodology. In
contrast with the Cholesky decomposition, generalized impulse-response functions do not depend on
the ordering of the equations; however as is the case with the Cholesky decomposition, generalized
impulse-responses are exactly identiﬁed and tests for reductions can not be performed.
Figure 3 presents the generalized impulse-response functions for four years (48 months). With
them, Efron’s 95% conﬁdence intervals are also presented. As discussed above, Efron’s bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals may not have the correct coverage in the presence of asymmetries. As one of the
sources of departures from normality is precisely this, Efron’s conﬁdence intervals are not advisable.
If we consider the last two columns of Figure 3 as the eﬀects of potential candidates for a
measure of the monetary policy innovation, we observe that if innovations to m are considered as
monetary policy we ﬁnd that surprise changes in the stock of money are persistent and predict
subsequent movements in both inﬂation and output. The later nevertheless is very short lived and
dies out almost instantaneously. On the other hand inﬂation increase only after a few periods (it
is not statistically signiﬁcant initially). However, the response to m innovations in this system
show what is sometimes called the “liquidity puzzle”: interest rates do not decline when m jumps
upward. The liquidity eﬀect, which hypothesizes that the policy-induced increased liquidity of a
monetary expansion should lower interest rates, seems not to be present if innovations to m are
considered as measures of monetary policy stance.
There is no problem with the liquidity eﬀect if the innovations of the UF interest rates are
considered as monetary policy (last column). In this case, the initial shock can be interpreted as
a monetary contraction. Here, there is a strong liquidity eﬀect until the ﬁfteenth month and it
eventually dies out. In terms of output, the d shocks shock has a short lived eﬀect on contracting
y. The problem with this shock arises when analyzing the eﬀect on p. This results that is very
common in the literature (Leeper et.al., 1996) has been labeled the “price puzzle”. Here, monetary
contractions tend to rise prices steadily!
Interpreting either column eight or nine as a monetary contraction therefore requires accepting
that monetary contractions produce inﬂation, which seems as unlikely an idea as the notion that
monetary expansions fail to lower interest rates.13
However, note that if d is considered as the monetary policy instrument, the ninth row shows
very plausible responses. That is, interest rates increase with positive shock on output and inﬂation.
The results from both IVAR and generalized impulse-response functions show that care should
be given in interpreting these type of innovations as monetary policy. Of course, traditional VAR
modeling renders even more implausible dynamic responses of prices and output (as we have shown
with the example of the s(2) shocks). The following section develops a theoretical model that may
help to explain why IVAR modeling is not suﬃcient for characterizing the eﬀects of alternative
policies and that this statistical exercise alone is not suﬃcient. That is, more structure that the S
preceding the VAR has to be considered.
13The “price puzzle ” is also present in the impulse-response functions of Valdés (1998) when the inﬂation target is
not considered. It is important to mention that several authors have concluded that the price puzzle can be eliminated
if terms of trade or the price of oil is included (Parrado, 2001). In our case, this was not possible; including terms of
trade did not change our results.
11However, VAR estimates provide excellent statistical characterizations of the dynamic inter-
actions of the variables considered. That we have problems trying to translate these statistical
objects on structural economic models such not constitute a surprise. Thus, this model should only
be considered as an statistical representation and not provide any structural interpretation to it.
Once we do that we must explain why supposedly deﬂationary policies produce inﬂations. We con-
sider our results simply as a metric with which to obtain estimates of deep parameters of internally
consistent dynamic models by using EMM.14 Once we do that, we can compare the responses of
the variables in the theoretical model with those that come from IVARs.
4 The Model
This section develops a simple optimizing model, whose empirical implications will be compared
with those of the econometric model described above. To make the model computationally man-
ageable and to gain insights with respect to the characteristics of the data that the model is and is
not able to replicate, we introduce stringent assumptions to the stylized economy that we model.
Needless to say, many of the assumptions come directly from the observed dynamic interactions of
key variables in the IVAR estimated above.
We consider a simple economy in which agents intend to maximize the expected discounted











where cm,t is the consumption of tradable (importable) goods in period t, ch,t is the consumption of
non tradable goods in period t, Mt denotes the nominal money stock that the individual acquires
at the beginning of period t and then holds through the end of the period, Ph,t is the price level of
non tradable goods, β is the subjective discount factor, Et denotes the conditional expectation on
information available on period t,a n du(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave function in all
its arguments.
A few observations are in order. We introduced money in the utility function in order to make
money valuable in general equilibrium. Implicit on this assumption is that money may be valuable
both as a store of wealth and a medium of exchange. Feenstra (1986) showed that this speciﬁcation
is equivalent to one that derives from the literature of transaction costs. Of course, cash-in-advance
constraints are merely special cases of the transaction costs technologies.15





















15The “neutrality” found on the previous section 3 may tempt us to work with speciﬁc a t i o n ss u c ha sc a s h - i n -
advance. However, that type of speciﬁcations impose the assumption of constant velocity which is not supported by
the data.
12where E is the nominal exchange rate, Tm is the import tariﬀ of a tradable good (qm)t h a tc a nb e
acquired in a competitive international market with price denoted by P∗
m, qh denotes the output
of the non tradable good produced in the economy and sold at price Ph. Agents may also acquire
indexed private bonds (in terms of non tradable goods, b) with sure return r that are in zero net
supply, nominal government bonds (B) with (net) nominal return i, government bonds indexed to
the UF (D) with net return d,16 and money balances that are carried to the next period. Finally,
Z denotes lump sum taxes (or transfers) levied by the government. As a ﬁrst approximation, the
outputs of the diﬀerent sectors of this economy will be characterized as stochastic endowments,
thus making resource allocations irrelevant.
The problem of the representative consumer can then be summarized by the value function that
satisﬁes:











subject to (6) and the perceived laws of motion of the states s.17





















where g is the level of government expenditure (in terms non tradables), α is the fraction of
government expenditures destined to the consumption of non tradables, and B∗ is the supply of
government bonds to foreign investors.
Finally, in order for this problem to be well deﬁned, we consider a representative foreign investor

















































m is an stochastic endowment, c∗
m is the level of consumption of a composite good by the
foreign representative agent, B∗ is the demand of bonds supplied by the domestic government, and
b∗ is the demand of international bonds (issued by the foreign authority) that yield a return of i∗.
The other variables are analogous to those of the domestic economy.
The foreign investor’s value function satisﬁes:
v∗ (s∗
















16The UF (Unidad de Fomento) is a unit of account indexed to present and past inﬂation rates. A further discussion
is presented below.
17We deﬁne st =
¡





13subject to (7) and the perceived laws of motion of the states s∗.18





























The market-clearing conditions for the tradable and non tradable markets are:



























where the ﬁrst equation describes the equilibrium in the non tradable good domestic market,
the second presents the equilibrium in the tradable good domestic market that shows that the
current account balance must be compensated by the capital account balance. Finally, the third
equation shows the equilibrium condition of the foreign economy’s good market (expressed in terms
of domestic currency) which displays a condition analogous the second. Note that in general
equilibrium the current account balance of one economy is the negative of the other; thus the
supply and demand of the tradable good equate.
We deﬁne a recursive competitive equilibrium for these economies as a set of prices and policy
functions such that markets clear. To ﬁnd the policy functions compatible with the market clearing
conditions we must solve the problems faced by each of the agents in these economies.
Appendix B demonstrates that the ﬁrst order conditions of both optimization problems can
be used to obtain the value of the real exchange rate (e),19 the equilibrium real interest rate for
the risk-free indexed private bond, the nominal interest rate of the risk free government bond, the
demand for domestic real balances, the foreign nominal interest rate, the no arbitrage condition,
and the demand for foreign real money holdings.
4.1 An Example
To gain insight with respect to the characteristics of the economy under consideration, the example
that follows shows how prices and real variables are determined. For that purpose we consider that


















where γ i st h eA r r o w - P r a t tc o n s t a n tr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient. In the particular case that





























19Deﬁned as a relative price between tradables and non tradables.
14which is the functional form that we will use for this example.
Suppose further that the domestic endowments follow ﬁrst order Markov processes that are
independent of foreign and domestic nominal variables. Consider that the domestic government
expenditures are a constant fraction of the production of non tradables that is partially ﬁnanced
by imposing a ﬁxed import tariﬀ on the tradable good. The monetary authority in the domestic
economy sets an UF indexed interest rate by supplying the amount of bonds that the foreign and
domestic markets are willing to take at the referred rate. We will introduce more structure to the
domestic monetary policy as needed.






δ (qh,t − αtgt)
(1 + Tm,t)ϕ(qm,t − (1 − αt) − Nt)
(8)


































where N is deﬁned as the net amount of foreign private capital inﬂows in terms of the tradable
good (current account deﬁcit plus payments of interests).
Even though the results displayed in the previous equations depend on the simple parameter-
ization chosen, their qualitative implications will hold for a wide variety of functional forms for
preferences.
Notice that (8) conﬁrms several beliefs in pop culture. The real exchange rate appreciates with
a decline on productivity on non tradables, an increase in productive on tradables, increased net
capital inﬂows, and trade protection. As Arrau, et.al. (1992) showed, the eﬀect of an increase in
government expenditure has an ambiguous eﬀect on the real exchange depending not only on its
propensity to consume non tradable good, but also on the structure of private consumption.
Equation (9) presents the condition that determines the value of the real interest rate in this
economy. Contrary to several claims, the monetary authority is not capable of aﬀecting it directly.
In this economy, in the long run, the real interest rate displays a positive relation with the growth
rate of the non tradable sector. This means, that an economy that is growing at a faster rate
than another, will have higher autarkic real interest rates. If there are limitations to the free ﬂow
of capital from one economy to the other, the economy that is growing faster, will have a higher
interest rate. This rate may have no relation with the “real interest rate” set by the monetary
15authority and thus, the claim that the Central Bank “sets” the real interest rate is fundamentally
incorrect.20 Then, what did the monetary authority set with instruments indexed to the UF?.
Equations (10) and (11) have the answer. If we combine them, we realize that both instruments
must be arbitraged, given that the terms in the expectation operators coincide. Thus, it does
not matter if the authority sets a nominal or an UF indexed rate. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence
between the law of motion of the UF and the actual price level shows that the real interest rate
will have fundamental diﬀerences with the UF indexed rate. The diﬀerence between them, is that
the later instrument and truly indexed bonds is contingent on the actual realization of inﬂation,
while the former is (or at least should be) set considering the expected rate of inﬂation. Thus the
diﬀerence between these two equations is precisely the same one that prevents the Fischer equation
to hold in the presence of uncertainty. The only case in which it would hold (on average) is if the
inﬂation process is independent of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. This condition
is not likely to hold precisely because the reaction function of the monetary authority (particularly
in Chile) is extremely dependent on its perception of the business cycle and the growth rate the
economy. In case the monetary authority sets an inﬂation target, equations (10) and (11) show
that it must be consistent with the interest rate chosen. Thus, either of these equations will help
to solve for the inﬂation rate consistent with the perceptions with respect to the evolution of the
economy (intertemporal marginal rate of substitution) and the monetary authority policy rule.
Finally, (12) determines the demand for real money holdings. Note that this equation is inde-
pendent of parameters that may characterize the monetary authority’s policy rule. However, it is
likely that if it changes, badly speciﬁe dm o n e yd e m a n de q u a t i o n sm a yﬁnd evidence of instability
even when there is none.
Several monetary policy arrangements can be examined even in this simple case. For example, if
the authority sets the nominal exchange rate, no arbitrage conditions with the foreign investor will
determine the nominal interest rate consistent with this policy. Likewise, (12) will endogenously
determine the money stock consistent with this policy.
4.2 Results
Section 3 showed the problems of using VAR and IVAR impulse-response functions to identify the
eﬀects of monetary policy are ill conditioned practices. Irrespective of the method used, it is diﬃcult
to rationalize several of the results that are supposed to capture the eﬀects of monetary policy.
Furthermore, as the theoretical model discussed previously shows, several dynamic interactions
between variables depend on the particular speciﬁcation for the policy rule of the government.
Our estimated model closes with a Taylor rule for the monetary authority:










+ a3 ln(1 + it)+ξt+1
where ys and πs denote the steady state values for output and inﬂation.
20Prior to the last quarter of 2001, the Central Bank of Chile set its policy rated with UF indexed instruments.
This fact, made many specialists and non-specialists to claim that the Central Bank sets the real interest rate. Of
course, this claim is fundamentally false.
16Our methodological steps are the following: First, use the gradients of the VAR(2) discussed on
Section 3 as the matching conditions for the theoretical model. Second, estimate the parameters
of the theoretical model using EMM and the gradients of the VAR model as the metric. Third,
once the estimates of the model are obtained, simulate a long simulation of the theoretical model,
estimate a VAR(2) with it, and derive the generalized impulse-response function. Finally, shock the




































5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
m
Figure 4: Response to monetary innovations. Continuous line: generalized impulse-response.
Dashed line: true impulse-response.
Figure 4 presents the results of comparing the impulse-response functions that are obtained
with the VAR(2) estimated with artiﬁcial data and the impulse-response functions that come from
the theoretical model. Several features are worth mentioning: First, the impulse-response functions
estimated with simulated data are broadly consistent with the data; that is the model also produces
a price puzzle, a small contraction on the level of activity, a slight appreciation, and strong liquidity
eﬀects. Second, the overidentifying restrictions test does not reject the null that the model captures
the dynamic interactions of the variables involved. Third, and most importantly, even though the
model replicates the impulse-response functions of the data, the true response of the variables with
respect to a monetary innovation have little to do with the responses that come from the VAR.
Given that the model has by construction a dichotomy between real and nominal variables,
monetary policy has no eﬀect on the real exchange rate and output, even when the impulse response
functions of the model show non-neutralities. This is so, because interest rates carry information
with respect of the future evolution of the economy; thus a higher interest rate signals lower output
21Here, true means the impulse-response function that is consistent with the theretical model and not the statistical
object.
17today with respect to the long run, as interest rates Granger cause output in this model (as did
in the example of Section 2), it is not surprising that the impulse-response functions may show
spurious responses of output to interest rate innovations.
More importantly, a case for neutrality (or almost neutrality) can be made precisely because
of the presence of the price puzzle. It must be conceded that models that display important
non-neutralities (with Phillips curves and such) would have a very diﬃcult time trying to explain
this puzzle. In our case, however, the theoretical model predicts that inﬂation and interest rates
should be positively correlated, precisely because of the inability of nominal variables to aﬀect real
variables. Thus, if the real interest rate remains basically constant, prices must follow the same
direction of the nominal interest rate innovation. This follows simply from the interaction of the
feed-back of the Taylor rule and the dichotomy with real variables.
Thus, the model shows that there are only few dimensions of the impulse-response functions
that are truly consistent with responses of fundamental models. Thus, the idea that VARs can help
to identify the eﬀects of monetary policy is naive.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The objectives of this paper were two-folded. First, to show that the traditional practice of quantify-
ing the eﬀects of monetary policy from impulse-response functions of VARs or IVARs is misleading.
It can not help as to recover the eﬀects of monetary policies because it is impossible to recover
structural shocks (independently of the structure chosen). Second, we constructed a simple metric
with which competing theoretical models can be compared. This second objective is important
because the theoretical and empirical literature in the ﬁeld of macroeconomics has not reached
a consensus with respect to which metric to use to judge how successful is a model in capturing
key features of the data. Our intention is to show is that such a metric can be constructed and
that the statistical object that comes from it can help us to understand which features of diﬀerent
theoretical models are important and which are not.
Our statistical model is a VAR(2) model comprised of nine variables and whose impulse-response
functions cannot be directly considered as structural. Furthermore, if we chose to do so, we should
have to concede that deﬂationary policies are inﬂationary or that the money demand depends
positively on interest rates.
The theoretical model that is estimated is broadly consistent with the VAR(2) model but has
striking implications. First, by construction, it displays neutrality of the monetary policy. Second,
precisely because of this feature, it is not diﬃcult to replicate impulse-response functions that
appear to be consistent with non-neutralities. Third, the price puzzle is only a puzzle for a model
that has as a major driving force important non-neutralities. Finally, even when the model has
built-in non neutralities, they must nit have ﬁrst order implications in order for it to be consistent
with the statistical object chosen.
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21A Estimation and Inference in an IVAR
This appendix presents a brief summary of the techniques used to estimate IVAR models, their
diﬀerences with traditional VARs, and the methods developed to test their speciﬁcation.
Consider a model of the type:
B0yt = k + B1yt−1 + ... + Bpyt−p + ut (A.1)
where yt is an n-vector, k is an n-vector of constants, Bi is an n × n matrix (i =0 ,..,p), and ut
is an n-vector white noise process with (diagonal) variance-covariance matrix D. Premultiplying
(A.1) by the inverse of B0 we obtain:
yt = c + C1yt−1 + ... + Cpyt−p + et (A.2)
where, given that u is a vector white noise process, and e = B−1
0 u, e is also a vector white noise
process with variance-covariance matrix Ω. Equation (A.2) is precisely the representation generally
used in VAR models, thus making it interpretable as a reduced form of (A.1). The only case in
which the VAR model would be equivalent to (A.1) is when B0 is an identity matrix. If some of
the oﬀ-diagonal elements of this matrix are diﬀerent from zero, the error terms on e will be formed
by linear combinations of the “structural” innovation u. Thus, the impulse-response functions
estimated with (A.2) can’t be interpreted as the dynamic response of the variables in the system
to the underlying innovations.
To recover the “structural” parameters of (A.1) we can use the parameters estimated from (A.2)























One advantage of this approach is that the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters that
solve (A.3) are readily available. Once the “structural” parameters are recovered, inference based
on likelihood ratio (LRT) or Wald tests can be conducted as usual.
O n ei m p o r t a n ti s s u ea st h a to fi d e n t i ﬁcation; recall that as Ω is symmetric, there are n(n+1)/2
distinct parameters in the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals of (A.2). Given that D is
diagonal, there are at most n(n−1)/2 parameters that can be estimated in B0 if the order condition
of identiﬁcation is to be satisﬁed. Thus, some restrictions (hopefully testable) have to be imposed. If
we denote by z the number of parameters estimated in B0, the number of overidentifying restrictions
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22See Hamilton (1994) for details.
22where  ∗ is the value of the log-likelihood function that maximizes (A.4).
This methodology provides not only a robust way of estimating the eﬀects of orthogonal in-
novations to the system, but may also be a useful tool for discriminating among models. Recall
that VARs impose a somewhat arbitrary ordering of the variables in the system that will aﬀect
the resulting impulse-response functions, while IVARs provide formal tests under which to contrast
alternative orderings and contemporaneous relations among variables. This feature may constitute
a valuable intermediate stage that provides insights with respect to the theoretical models that can
and cannot be used in order to replicate the dynamic interactions between variables. Nevertheless,
as IVARs heavily rely on the identifying assumptions imposed on them, they are useful only as
intermediate devices between data and theory.
A healthy practice, whether using VARs or IVARs is to compute standard errors (and thus con-
ﬁdence intervals) associated with the impulse-response functions. Traditional econometric packages
rely on the asymptotic distribution of the impulse-response functions or on Monte Carlo experi-
ments (based on the maintained hypothesis of Gaussian innovations) to construct them. These
methods may however provide poor approximations to the conﬁdence intervals in small samples
even with the assumption of normality (due to small sample bias of the OLS estimators). Another
important problem that this type of conﬁdence intervals has is that they are symmetric (due to
the assumption of normality). In ﬁnite samples, the innovations may have important departures
from normality (typically leptokurtosis) and may not be symmetric (if there is skewness), thus the
Monte Carlo approximation may not be advisable. In this case bootstrap, methods may be used to
replicate the empirical distribution of the innovations. Sims and Zha (1995) also advise to construct
conﬁdence intervals that may help to correct the pervasive nature of the biases implicit in the VAR
estimation. This can be done again with bootstrapping.23
23Christiano, et al (1996) provide a detailed description of the algorithm used to construct both the impulse-
response functions and conﬁdence intervals with bootstrapping. Sims and Zha (1995) describe the algorithm used for
bias reduction.
23B Equilibrium Conditions for the Theoretical Model
This Appendix derives the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimization problems of the domestic
representative consumer and the representative foreign investor. These conditions are latter used
to describe the characteristics of the equilibrium conditions of the economies presented in the
theoretical model.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ch,t,c m,t,b t,B t,D t and Mt for the representative
domestic consumer are:
u0
ch,t − λt =0 (B.1)
u0
























where λ is the dynamic multiplier associated with the constraint (6). The corresponding enve-
lope conditions are:
v0
















Combining (B.1) and (B.2) we ﬁnd that the real exchange rate (e), deﬁned as the relative
price between tradables and non tradables is given by the ratio of marginal utilities between the











Combining (B.3) and (B.7) we ﬁnd the condition that determines the equilibrium real interest
rate for the risk-free indexed private bond, while combining (B.4) and (B.8) we encounter the
equilibrium condition that determines the nominal interest rate of the risk free government bond.
Finally, combining (B.5) and (B.9) we ﬁnd the equilibrium interest rate for the UF indexed bond.
That is:









































where can be approximated by 21/30.24
Finally, combining (B.6) and (B.10), and using (B.13) we can derive the condition that deter-










These equations combined with the market clearing conditions and the policy rules followed by
the public sector (and the functional form of preferences) will determine the temporal trajectory
of these variables.




































where in this case λ∗ is the dynamic multiplier associated with (7). The envelope conditions for





























24The UF has a deterministic law of motion that depends on a weighted average of present and past inﬂations.
Assuming that a typical month has 30 days, the variation of the UF from the last day of month t to the last day of
month t +1is given by (B.15), where P is the consumption-based price level derived in Appendix C.
25As in the previous problem, we can ﬁnd the equilibrium conditions for the foreign nominal inter-
est rate, the no arbitrage condition, and the demand for foreign real money balances by combining
the envelope and the ﬁrst order conditions which yield:













































The Euler equations of both problems were solved considering binding constraints (because of
the assumption that both utility functions are strictly increasing). The values of these variables
will be determined in general equilibrium by their interaction with the market clearing conditions
and the laws of motion of the states (including government policies).
With relatively mild conditions, existence and uniqueness for the value functions of both prob-
lems can be demonstrated by using Blackwell’s conditions for contraction and contraction mapping
theorem arguments (see Altug and Labadie, 1994 or Stokey et al, 1989).
26C The Aggregate Consumption-Based Price Index
This Appendix derives the aggregate consumption-based price index for the CES utility function,
extending the derivations of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) for an economy with a tradable good, a
non tradable good, and money.
Let c = f (ch,c m,n) be a composite consumption good that is a linear-homogeneous function of
ch,c m,a n dn,w h e r en = M/Ph. We are interested in ﬁnding a price index associated with c that
will tell us how much of it can a consumer obtain from a given level of expenditure Z (denominated
in domestic currency).
We deﬁne the aggregate consumption-based price index P as the minimum expenditure Z =
Phch +(1+Tm)P∗
mEcm +Wnsuch that c = f (ch,c m,n)=1 ,g i v e nPh,P∗
m,E,T m and W.W h e r e
in this case W denotes the user cost of holding currency whose closed form expression will be
derived below.




















; ϕ,δ ∈ (0,1),θ > 0 (C.1)
The highest value of the index c for a given value of Z (found by substituting the demands for




































































Deﬁning P to be the minimum expenditure needed to obtain c =1 , we can solve for P by
imposing P = Z and equating (C.2) to 1. After trivial manipulations and using (B.11), the price
index is given by:
Pt = Ph,t
h
ϕ + δ (et (1 + Tm,t))
1−θ +( 1− ϕ − δ)W1−θ
i 1
1−θ
As W results from the ratio of the marginal utility of real money holdings and the marginal
utility of consumption of non tradables, we correctly infer that Wt is simply the right hand side of
(B.16). Thus the consumption based price index adopts the form:
Pt = Ph,t
"
ϕ + δ (et (1 + Tm,t))







27Expression (C.3) can be used to compute the evolution of the ”general” price level, once the
other prices are determined.
If (C.1) were Cobb-Douglas (i.e. θ=1), (C.4) converges to:
Pt = Ph,t
"







A trivial extension to (C.3) for the case of the foreign economy is analyzed by Obstfeld and














where the values of the parameters with superscripts correspond to those of the foreign consumers.
28DT h e E ﬃcient Method of Moments
This Appendix is based on Chumacero (1997) and present a brief introduction to the type of
Eﬃcient Method of Moments (EMM) estimators that are used in the paper.25
Consider a stationary stochastic process p(yt |xt,ρ) that describes yt in terms of exogenous
variables xt and structural parameters ρ which the researcher is interested in estimating. Consider
an auxiliary model f (yt |xt,θ) that has an analytical expression whereas the p(·) density may not.
Gallant and Tauchen (1996) propose to use the scores
∂ lnf (yt |xt,θ)
∂θ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
b θT
where












¯ ¯ ¯x,b θT
´
p(y|x,ρ) dyp(x|ρ) dx
In cases in which analytical expressions for these integrals are not available, simulation may be







¯ ¯ ¯e xn,b θT
´
where N is the sample size of the Monte Carlo integral approximation drawn from one sample of
y, x generated for a given value of ρ in the structural model.
The GMM estimator of ρ with an eﬃcient weighting matrix is given by:
b ρN =a r gm i n
ρ∈R
m0
N (ρ) c W−1
T mN (ρ) (D.1)
where, if the auxiliary model constitutes a good statistical description of the data generating process















¯ ¯ ¯xt,b θT
´i0
Gallant and Tauchen (1996) demonstrate the strong convergence and asymptotic normality of
the estimator presented in (D.1) as well as the asymptotic distribution of the objective function
that b ρN minimizes. That is, let k by the dimension of ρ and q the dimension of θ, then:
TJT = Tm0
N (b ρ) c W−1
T mN (b ρ)
D → χ2
q−k
25The interested reader is referred to Gallant and Tauchen (1996) for a complete and formal treatment of this an
other setups in which EMM can be applied. Chumacero (1997) presents Monte Carlo evidence that shows that this
technique is superior to GMM in several dimensions.
29which corresponds to the familiar overidentifying restrictions test described by Hansen (1982). As
in GMM, identiﬁcation requires that q>k . Thus, statistical inference may be carried out in
identical fashion as in GMM. However, depending on the complexity of the auxiliary model, Wald
type tests based on the variance-covariance matrix obtained by diﬀerentiating the moments may
be diﬃcult to construct.
One major advantage of EMM is that the econometrician does not need to observe directly all
the variables in the structural model to compute ρ. This feature is extremely attractive, because in
many cases the poor small sample performance of GMM estimators is due to the limited amount
of observations that the econometrician has in order to estimate the structural model.
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